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Bernard Meltzer has testified under oath that he "rarely
take[s] absolute positions."1 The record bears him out. While his
colleagues among labor law scholars often strain to demonstrate
that the labor relations statutes and even the Constitution support
their hearts' desires,2 the typical Meltzer stance is one of cool detachment, pragmatic assessment, and cautious, balanced judgment.
The "itch to do good," Meltzer has remarked wryly, "is a doubtful
basis for jurisdiction" 3 -or, he would likely add, for any other legal
conclusion.
In this brief commentary I propose to examine the Meltzer approach to four broad areas of labor law: (1) the regulation of employer and union economic weapons; (2) labor relations and the
antitrust laws; (3) competing and overlapping rights and remedies;
and (4) the treatment of racial discrimination. From this overview
t James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
I Wood v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 406, No. G80-742-CA1 (W.D. Mich.),
Tr. 4-111 (Oct. 2, 1984) (Meltzer testimony as expert witness).
2 See, e.g., Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause"
Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDus. REL. L.J. 519, 520, 563-64 (1978) (Civil Rights Act of
1964 protects employees against unjust dismissal as well as against discrimination because
of race, sex, religion, or national origin); Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 663, 773 (1973) (collective bargaining agreement is not a
contract between employer and employee; neither may bring suit against the other for
breach of contract); Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert"
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 336-39 (1981) (NLRA
protects individual employee protests as well as group employee protests); Klare, Judicial
Deradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 19371941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 284-85 (1978) (original NLRA was designed to give workers an
autonomous role in industrial decisionmaking); Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHio ST. L.J. 1, 4, 20-42 (1979) (constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection preclude continuing adherence to at-will
employment doctrine). I claim no immunity from the indictment in the text. See St. Antoine, Legal Barriers to Worker Participationin Management Decision Making, 58 TuL.L.
REv. 1301, 1305-07 (1984) (substantially all lawful contract proposals should be mandatory
subjects of bargaining under the NLRA).
s Meltzer, Labor Arbitrationand Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination,39 U. CHI. L. REV. 30, 34 (1971).
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I would say that Meltzer is at his best in the clear-eyed untangling
of legislative intent and the even-handed appraisal of opposing interests. He fares less well, I think, in responding to flesh-and-blood
exigencies, including the needs and demands of rank-and-file
workers.
I.

THE REGULATION OF ECONOMIC POWER

Meltzer has recognized that ours is "a labor policy which has
evolved no general alternative to the use of economic pressure as a
means of breaking a bargaining impasse,"4 and which continues to
acknowledge the role of economic weapons in securing representation." Our labor policy thus requires that lines be drawn between
legitimate and illegitimate exercises of economic power. The National Labor Relations Board and the courts have, in Meltzer's
view, too often lapsed into "empty sloganeering," 6 developing "unreal and unworkable distinctions" in this area which evade judicial
responsibility and unwittingly encourage unions and employers to
resort to crafty rhetoric and disingenuous bargaining tactics.7 His
approach is well demonstrated by his treatment of lockouts and
organizational picketing.
A.

The Lockout Cases

A lockout occurs when an employer voluntarily withholds
work from its employees. When Meltzer entered the debate in
1956,8 the Board had identified three types of lockouts.9 "Offensive" bargaining lockouts, designed to apply economic pressure as
a means of breaking a deadlock in negotiations, were deemed to be
reprisals against concerted activity protected under section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 10 and were thus illegal even
in the absence of anti-union animus." Two kinds of defensive lock4 Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Under the Taft-Hartley
Act, 24 U. CHL L. REv. 70, 97 (1956).
' Meltzer, OrganizationalPicketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHL L.
REv. 78, 79 (1962) (Taft-Hartley Act reached "only the cruder pressures through which unwanted unions might foist themselves on employees").
' Meltzer, supra note 4, at 80.
7 Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 80.
' See Meltzer, Lockouts under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain, 28 U.
CHL L. REv. 614, 614-15 (1961) (discussing Board's categories).
" Ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982)).
" See, e.g., Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448, 1460-65 (1952), enforced,
204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953).
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outs were recognized. "Economic" lockouts, which merely seek to
keep employers from incurring extraordinary losses due to the timing of an imminent strike, were permitted. For example, an auto
dealer's service department, faced with an imminent strike, was
permitted to engage in a lockout in order to prevent customers'
cars from being tied up in the course of repairs. 12 Finally, a defensive lockout by members of a multiemployer bargaining unit, in
the form of a temporary shutdown, was held to be a lawful response to a union "whipsaw" strike that threatened the unit with
disintegration. 13
In a series of articles, Meltzer argued vigorously that the illegality of offensive bargaining lockouts could not be sustained in
the face of the legality of economic and defensive multiemployer
lockouts. 14 He pointed out quite correctly that the Board's major
premise, that any interference with strikes or other protected activity is unlawful, was "manifestly incompatible"' 5 with employers'
long-standing right to replace economic strikers 6--an option
which, when feasible, would be even more deleterious to employee
rights and to industrial peace than a bargaining lockout. Meltzer
concluded that the Board's line between bargaining and nonbargaining lockouts was untenable: both are economic weapons that
may inflict losses on employees as a consequence of concerted ac17
tion, and both thus inhibit activity protected by the NLRA.
Moreover, he insisted that bargaining lockouts were standard practice before the enactment of the Wagner Act,' 8 and that the Act's
explicit recognition of the right to strike was not intended to expand the scope of protected activities by eliminating "the common
law legality of lockouts."' 9 Most forcibly of all, Meltzer maintained
that the Supreme Court itself had acknowledged the exercise of
economic power as central to the bargaining process, and had rejected the Board's efforts to equalize disparities in bargaining
power. 20 He observed that "the apparently unauthorized quest for
Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268, 289 (1951).
See Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447, 448 (1954), rev'd sub nom. Truck
Drivers Local Union No. 449 v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87
(1957).
14 See Meltzer, supra note 4; Meltzer, supra note 9; Meltzer, Lockouts: Licit and IIlicit, 16 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 19 (1963).
" Meltzer, supra note 9, at 616.
See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
17 Meltzer, supra note 9, at 628.
18 Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1982)).
12
13

-Meltzer, supra note 4, at 80.

20 Meltzer, supra note 9, at 619-20.
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such equalization . . . underlies the Board's lockout prohibition"
21

and rejected it accordingly.
Meltzer invested substantial intellectual capital in his thesis
that the NLRA permits offensive bargaining lockouts. Yet when
the Supreme Court eventually adopted the essence of his position
in a celebrated pair of 1965 decisions, Meltzer devoted scant attention to his triumph. Instead, he delivered a penetrating critique of
the Court's methodology and the broader implications of its
rationale.
The first of these cases, NLRB v. Brown,22 involved a union
whipsaw strike against one retail food store in a multiemployer
bargaining unit. The struck employer continued operations, using
temporary help. 23 In turn the unstruck members of the multiemployer group locked out their union workers, and also remained
open by hiring temporary replacements. Prior case law had sustained the right of unstruck members of a multiemployer group to
shut down to retain parity when the struck member of the group
shut down. 24 As a result of what it saw to be a "critical difference"25 between shutting down and continuing operations with
temporary replacements, the Board found that the unstruck employers in Brown had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA.

26

In the second case, American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,2 7 a
single employer, the operator of four shipyards on the Great Lakes,
reached a bargaining impasse with the unions representing its employees. Fearful that the unions would time a strike to immobilize
vessels in the course of repairs or to put pressure on the employer
during the busy winter repair period, the employer proceeded to
lay off workers in what amounted to a graduated lockout. The
shipyards made no effort to hire either temporary or permanent
replacements. Rejecting the employer's contention that it had rea21 Id. at 620.
2 380 U.S. 278 (1965), aff'g 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963), denying enforcement to John
Brown, 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
23 This course of conduct was lawful; under NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304
U.S. 333 (1938), the struck employer would even have had the right to hire permanent
replacements. See Brown, 380 U.S. at 290.
24 See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87
(1957).
2' Brown, 137 N.L.R.B. at 75.
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3) (1982).
27 380 U.S. 300 (1965), af'g 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1964), enforcing American Ship
Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1962).
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son to fear an imminent strike,28 the Board found violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA despite failing to consider,
as it also failed to consider in Brown, whether there was subjective
anti-union animus on the employer's part.
Both Brown and American Ship Building might easily have
been decided, as two concurring Justices urged,29 on the well-established theory of legitimate "defensive" lockouts: Brown as a
multiemployer lockout seeking to preserve the integrity of the
group, and American Ship Building as an economic lockout to defend against an ill-timed and particularly harmful strike. But a sixmember majority plainly wished to write a more novel text.30 The
majority was prepared generally to uphold an employer's use of a
bargaining lockout in the absence of discriminatory motivation.
For most purposes, the Board later stated, the majority in Brown
and American Ship Building had "obliterated" the legal distinction between offensive and defensive lockouts.31
Meltzer naturally had no quarrel with that result, and indeed
adduced strong historical evidence to support it. 32 But his princi-

pal focus was the Court's failure to "harmonize" the "conflicting
themes of its earlier opinions" or to "acknowledge" the difficulty
and "make as clean a choice as possible between its own disparate
approaches."33 By this failure, the Court "perpetuated past confusions by implying that they did not exist."3 4 The result was a travesty of principled decisionmaking and, perhaps even more important as a practical matter, a substantial default on the Court's
major obligation of developing comprehensible, predictive standards for the guidance of lower courts and administrative
tribunals.
Earlier, in NLRB v. Insurance Agents InternationalUnion,35
the Supreme Court had laid down the bedrock proposition that the
28 142 N.L.R.B. at 1363, 1364.
29 Justice Goldberg and Chief Justice Warren concurred in Brown, 380 U.S. at 292, and
in American Ship Building, 380 U.S. at 327.
" Somewhat surprisingly, the Court chose two separate amanuenses, Justice Stewart in
American Ship Building and Justice Brennan in Brown, a procedure which may have contributed to the "tension" that Meltzer perceived between the approaches followed in the
two opinions. See Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 87, 105.
32 Evening News Ass'n, 166 N.L.R.B. 219, 221 (1967). This may have been an overstatement. The distinction might still have been significant for issues the Court in American
Ship Building had left open: whether a single employer could lock out prior to a bargaining
impasse or hire replacements during a lockout. See Brown, 380 U.S. at 308 & n.8.
" See Meltzer, supra note 30, at 99-100.
33 Id. at 96.
34 Id.
35 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
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NLRA did not install the Board as an "arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain acceptance of
their bargaining demands."3 6 A union may thus resort to nontraditional forms of economic pressure designed to harass the employer, 7 and an employer may permanently replace economic
strikers in order to carry on its business.3 Yet in NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp. 9 the Court had also declared that Congress had
committed "primarily" to the Board "the balancing of conflicting
legitimate interests . . .to effectuate national labor policy," sub-

ject to "limited" judicial review.40 The Court held in Erie Resistor
that the Board could find it violative of both sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) of the Act for an employer to grant superseniority to strike
replacements, even though the employer was free of anti-union animus and acted solely for legitimate business ends.41 Since to the
Board's "experienced eye" the "claimed business purpose would
not outweigh the necessary harm to employee rights," the Board
could "put aside evidence of [employer] motive": 42 the "inherently
destructive"
nature of the conduct "carried its own indicia of
3
intent.

4

Understating the situation, Meltzer commented that "Erie Resistor appeared to sanction the Board's exercise of the power denied to it by Insurance Agents.

' 44

Brown and American Ship

Building offered the Court the opportunity to set matters straight.
Instead, it straddled the fence. Citing Erie Resistor, the Court reiterated that the Board "need not inquire into employer motivation"
if the conduct is "demonstrably destructive of employee rights and
is not justified by the service of significant or important business
ends. '45 But, echoing Insurance Agents, the Court proclaimed that
"[s]ections 8(a)(1) and (3) do not give the Board a general author31

Id.

at 497. This principle apparently still commanded the Court's support at the

time of the lockout cases: it was quoted approvingly in Brown, 380 U.S. at 283, and in
American Ship Building, 380 U.S. at 317-18.
37 361 U.S. at 480-81, 495-96 (discussing union's on-the-job actions).
38NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
39 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
,0Id. at 236 (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449 (Buffalo Linen),
353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
4 373 U.S. at 237.
42 Id. at 230, 236-37.
41 Id. at 228, 231.
44 Meltzer, supra note 30, at 95.
4' Brown, 380 U.S. at 282-83; cf. American Ship Building, 380 U.S. at 309, 311-12 (unlike the superseniority in Erie Resistor, the lockout is not "one of those acts which are
demonstrably so destructive ... that the Board need not inquire into employer
motivation").
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ity to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the
bargaining process and to deny weapons to one party or the other
'
because of its assessment of that party's bargaining power."46
What does it mean, concretely, to say that the Board may determine that certain conduct is so "destructive" of employee rights
as to "carry its own indicia of [unlawful] intent," but that the
Board may not "deny weapons to one party or the other because of
its assessment of that party's bargaining power"? Why, more specifically, does superseniority fall within the unlawful "inherently
destructive" category and permanent replacements and lockouts
within the lawful "bargaining weapon" category? What particular
evidence should union, employer, or Board counsel assemble to
demonstrate that "employee rights" are threatened with "destruction" or, conversely, that challenged conduct is a mere exercise of
47
"bargaining power"?
Meltzer recognized that questions involving bargaining lockouts do not turn on "expertise" or the "detailed application of a
general standard"-his characterization of the reigning standards
as "loose" is overly generous. His comments on the proper role of
the courts in this area are highly suggestive, if diplomatically
phrased. He stated that there are "strong reasons against limited
judicial review of the Board's evaluation of the bargaining lockout. 48 At stake are the "basic premises of the statute," the "evenhandedness, the real and apparent integrity, of the regulatory
system as it is applied to unions and employers, respectively."4 9
Such questions "warrant broad judicial review," not the Court's
"ritual of deference. ' 50 Meltzer is too much the gentleman to have
come straight out with it, but he seemed to be saying that by 1965
the Kennedy-Johnson Board had become too identified with the
interests of organized labor to be trusted with an "impressionistic
assessment" of the impact of economic pressures on "that will-o'-

46 American Ship Building, 380 U.S. at 317; see also Brown, 380 U.S. at 283 (the Board
is not an "arbiter of the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in seeking to gain
acceptance of their bargaining demands") (quoting Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 497).
47 In American Ship Building the Court remarked that "there is no indication, either
as a general matter or in this specific case, that the lockout will necessarily destroy the
unions' capacity for effective and responsible representation." 380 U.S. at 309. Yet the AFLCIO in American Ship Building had placed before the Court data on the liquid asset holdings of workers at various income levels in order to illustrate their vulnerability to a lockout.
Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae at 10-11 & n.6, American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,
380 U.S. 300 (1965).
48 Meltzer, supra note 30, at 103.
Id. (emphasis added).

50 Id.
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the-wisp, 'bargaining power.' "51 He did not, however, provide
much in the way of alternative standards for the courts of appeals
that now must flounder about in the areas where the Supreme
Court declines to grant certiorari.
A true Meltzerian conclusion capped this appraisal of Brown
and American Ship Building. He eschewed any summary of his
statutory analysis in favor of a more personal note. Lamenting the
Court's unwillingness to face up to the "formidable difficulties" in
the lockout cases, he reflected poignantly on the wider manifestations of this disingenuousness: "A fuller acknowledgment of the
difficulties would have been welcome as an end in itself at a time
when it is only too fashionable to obscure the sources of
52
problems.
B.

The Problem of Organizational Picketing

Suppose that Restaurant Workers Local 100 has organized five
of the six eateries on Main Street. The employees of the Sugar
Bowl, the sixth establishment, oppose unionization. They have refused to sign cards authorizing Local 100 to represent them, have
crossed Local 100's picket line, have even voted against Local 100
in a secret-ballot election conducted by the Board. Nevertheless,
the union maintains a constant patrol on the public sidewalk in
front of the restaurant, complete with large placards denouncing
the Sugar Bowl as "Unfair" because it does not have a contract
with Local 100. This picketing could be characterized either as "organizational," designed to enlist employees into the union, or as
"recognitional," designed to induce the employer to accept the
union as its employees' exclusive bargaining agent. For our purposes we can treat it as all the same.s
We can easily identify several competing interests and conflicting policy considerations. The Sugar Bowl employees are being
coerced to join the union despite their manifest and seemingly free
choice. The employer is under economic pressure either to recognize a union that lacks majority support or to force its employees
into the union against their will. Either course would violate the
NLRA. The union and the Main Street restaurant employees it
has organized face the danger that their gains will be undermined
51
52

Id.
Id. at 118.

53 Influential commentators have regarded the distinction as artificial. See Cox, The
Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257,
265 (1959); Meltzer, supra note 5, at 79 & n.10.
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by competition from the Sugar Bowl, which can exploit the advantages of non-union wages and working conditions. The union may
also have some constitutional rights to assert. The interests of the
public are more diffuse: some consumers will resent and resist the
union's appeals, others are potentially eager allies.
In 1959, Congress struck what Meltzer described as a "murky
compromise ' 54 among these various interests by adding section
8(b)(7) to the NLRA 5 The new provision required the Board's
election processes to be invoked within thirty days of the onset of
organizational picketing, and prohibited organizational picketing
entirely if no election were possible because of the incumbency of
another union or because a valid election had recently been held.
The purport of the section was to accentuate voting and deemphasize picketing as the means of resolving representational
disputes.
Meltzer's handling of three knotty interpretive problems
presented by section 8(b)(7) illustrates the special blend of pragmatism and principle that characterizes his reading of statutes.
Under the procedures of the new provision, the Board must hold
an "expedited" election whenever a union engaged in what would
otherwise be excessive organizational picketing files a timely election petition. The Board had held in an early case that the picketing union must file an election petition within the statutory period
even if the employer has committed an unfair labor practice (except a refusal to bargain under section 8(a)(5)).5 6 But the Board
will not conduct an election until it has processed the pending unfair labor practice charge, and indeed will permit the organizational picketing to continue until it has disposed of the "blocking"
charge.57 To Meltzer this meant that "the express statutory purpose of avoiding protracted recognitional picketing will be sacrificed in order to achieve untainted elections. 5 8 Yet he found the
election postponement justified: "tainted elections should not govern employee or union representation rights. 51 9 On the "[miuch
more troublesome" issue of prolonged picketing, he took comfort
from the assurance of the Board's Chicago Regional Office that
"blocking charges, where frivolous, are disposed of 'expeditiously'

5

56
(1961),
57

58
9

Meltzer, supra note 5, at 81.
73 Stat. 544 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1982)).
International Hod Carriers Union Local 840 (Blinne Constr. Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. 587
modified and aff'd on rehearing,135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
135 N.L.R.B. at 1166.
Meltzer, supra note 5, at 87.
Id.

Meltzer's Labor Law Vision

1986]

and that meritorious charges usually result in a quick settlement
and a quick election."' 0 Understandably, he still thought it would
be helpful "to have more precise data concerning the effects and
merits of blocking charges. '
By their terms, the general prohibitions of section 8(b)(7) apply only to organizational and recognitional picketing. Perhaps to
meet possible constitutional objections, a proviso was added that
insulates picketing for "the purpose" of "truthfully advising the
public" of the nonunion status of the employer even beyond the
thirty-day statutory limit, as long as the picketing does not induce
stoppages of deliveries or other services. But the proviso is ambiguous: picketing rarely has a single purpose. A divided Eisenhower
Board first held that the proviso applied only to "purely informational" picketing, "picketing where the sole object is dissemination
of information divorced from a present object of recognition. '62 A
divided Kennedy Board then reversed, reasoning that the publicity
proviso had been rendered meaningless by the prior Board's construction. The main body of section 8(b)(7) did not cover nonrecognitional picketing at all; the proviso had no meaning if it only
excluded cases which were never included in the statute's general
prohibition. The proviso must therefore apply to recognitional
picketing that also informs the public, but causes no delivery
stoppages0 3
Meltzer, not without reason, considered the arguments based
on the text of "this inelegant proviso. . . evenly balanced," but for
him "a practical consideration . . . tip[ped] the scales" in favor of
the Kennedy Board's position." If presence of a recognitional purpose is not determinative of legality, the Board need not confront
the "substantial difficulties" of pursuing the "elusive purposes" of
the picketing. 5 The decisive factor instead becomes the objective
consequences of picketing-the presence or absence of a stoppage
of services.
Meltzer's emphasis on objective consequences and, one may
assume, his first-hand knowledge of industrial relations, led him to
11 Id. at 88 (footnote omitted).
61 Id.

62Local Joint Executive Bd. of Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Union (Crown
Cafeteria), 130 N.L.R.B. 570, 573 (1961), rev'd on rehearing,135 N.L.R.B. 1183 (1962), aff'd
sub nom. Smitley v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1964).
"' See 135 N.L.R.B. at 1184 (adopting dissenting opinion in first decision); 130
N.L.R.B. at 575 (Members Jenkins & Fanning, dissenting).
" Meltzer, supra note 5, at 90 (footnote omitted).
45

Id.
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challenge the Board on yet another important 8(b)(7) issue. Returning to our Main Street scenario, suppose that Restaurant
Workers Local 100 has found the Sugar Bowl to be an unscrupulous and deceitful adversary which it no longer desires to organize.
Still, Local 100 does not wish to leave the restaurant free to undercut Main Street's union wages and conditions. So the union sets up
what its lawyer characterizes as "purely informational area standards" picketing in front of the Sugar Bowl, calling the public's
attention to the existing state of affairs but expressly disclaiming
any present or future recognitional objective. Loyal Teamsters spot
the pickets and refuse to make deliveries to the Sugar Bowl. Does
the picketing violate section 8(b)(7) if it exceeds the thirty-day
limit? Note that an affirmative answer to the question means that
the picketing is illegal; the proviso to section 8(b)(7) is inapplicable
because the picketing caused a stoppage of deliveries. The Labor
Board has answered the question in the negative, holding that
picketing which merely seeks to require an employer to conform to
prevailing area standards is legal because it lacks the prohibited
organizational or recognitional objective.6
In Meltzer's view, the Board's position places too high a premium on the "right rhetoric and cag[iness]. ' 6 7 To Meltzer, primary
picketing is typically aimed at recognition, even if its ostensible
purpose is informing the public or protesting substandard conditions. Most important, all primary picketing, regardless of its rhetoric, is likely to trigger the same reaction by employers, employees,
and sister unions-and will thus produce the "adverse consequences on employee free-choice" and other abuses that section
8(b)(7) seeks to prevent.
As usual, there is much force and good sense in Meltzer's
stance. I cannot rid myself of the notion, however, that certain restrictions on "purely informational" picketing raise grave constitutional questions.68 But Meltzer feels otherwise, 9 and so far the Supreme Court sides with him.70 Finally, from a blunter realpolitik
perspective, I am concerned with the role that the interpretation of
regulations like section 8(b)(7) plays in altering the balance of
66 Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Claude Everett Constr. Co.), 136 N.L.R.B.
321 (1962).
6 Meltzer, supra note 5, at 91-92.
68 See St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem of
Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 883 (1982). My greatest concern is with picketing addressed
to individual, uncoerced members of the consuming public.
6 Meltzer, supra note 5, at 88-89.
1 NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
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power between labor and management. That balance has shifted
71
almost steadily away from organized labor since the mid-1950s. I
do not mean to suggest that so complex a phenomenon is attributable to any single factor, including law. But in my view, courts,
the Board, and the academic community ought to be concerned
with the effects of their positions on the great glacial movements
that will ultimately shape the future of industrial relations. Perhaps what Meltzer takes to be evidence of irresponsibility on the
part of the Court and the Board is instead evidence that they have
chosen to exercise what I take to be the full scope of their
responsibility.

II. LABOR AND ANTITRUST
Although it is heard much less today, the cry that labor organizations should be subjected to the strictures of the antitrust laws
resounded through the halls of Congress, the popular press, and
parts of academia during the two decades following the Second
World War.72 In a 1965 article, Meltzer characteristically began by
faulting the "obscurity of [the] suggestion"-the failure of its proponents to identify the union activities their proposal would reach
beyond those already covered by labor legislation (such as secondary boycotts) or by the Sherman Act (such as union-employer mar73
ket divisions).
Labor-antitrust can fairly be called the oldest form of federal
labor law. Under classical trade union theory, the aim of unionization is to eliminate wage competition by "organizing all or substantially all firms producing for a common market. 7 4 Unions are thus
inherently monopolistic. Yet by the time federal antitrust law su71 In 1954 over 38 percent of private nonagricultural employees were unionized; that
figure fell to 30 percent by the mid-1960s and to 24 percent by 1980. R. FREEMAN & J.

MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 222, figure 15-1 (1984). It is still falling, and may now be
below 20 percent. See BNA Survey on Union Membership Statistics, 117 LAB. REL. REP.

(BNA) 81 (Oct. 1, 1984).
711See

Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining,and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U.

CH!. L. REV. 659, 704-14 (1965) (considering proposals); see also Cox, Labor and the Anti-

trust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA.L. R.v.252, 252-53 (1955) (critiquing the

conclusions of the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws, which concluded that some union activities ought to be made subject to the
antitrust laws); Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and Allen Bradley, 13 LAB. L.J. 957, 957-60 (1962) (discussing proposals and concluding that antitrust laws
provide adequate protection).
71Meltzer, supra note 72, at 660.
74Id. at 660 n.5; see also S. WEBB & B. WEB, INDusTRIAL DEMOCRACY 173-79 (2d ed.
1920) (describing the method of collective bargaining).
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perseded the common law as the principal brake on restrictive
commercial practices, the courts had ceased to view the exercise of
union monopoly power, as such, as an illegal act.7 5 Under early federal antitrust law, the garden-variety "primary" strike was lawful;7 6
but "boycotts," insofar as they suppressed interstate competition
and were thus within the scope of federal power, were unlawful.7
From that point on, federal labor-antitrust law developed during a
period of radical change in public policy toward organized labor.
This history guarantees that the case law will defy simple rationalization. Even so, from approximately 1945 to 1965, a plausible
summation of the Supreme Court's contemporary teachings on labor-antitrust could have read as follows: The Sherman Act7 8 applies only to a "restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods and services, ' 79 and not to "an elimination of price
competition based on differences in labor standards."8' 0 This is not
a matter of a statutory "labor exemption"; the Sherman Act, as
written, covers only the product market, not the labor market. 1
On the other hand, the Clayton8 2 and Norris-LaGuardia 83 Acts,
taken together, introduced a true exemption for a union acting
alone in its own interest and not combining with nonlabor
groups.8 4 The obvious corollary, announced in the famous Allen
Bradley case, was that labor organizations lose their immunity
when they "aid nonlabor groups to create business monopolies and
' s5
to control the marketing of goods and services.1
Meltzer would probably regard the foregoing encapsulation as
overly simplified, especially in its sharpening of the line between

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 128-32 (1842).
7'See UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922). But cf. Coronado Coal Co. v.
UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (primary strike with actual intent to bar nonunion product from
interstate market is Sherman Act violation).
7 See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
78 Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
70 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940) (footnote omitted).
:0 Id. at 503.
8' See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 621-23 (1975). See generally St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of
Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REv. 603, 604-08 (1976) (presenting a historical survey of the Court's
treatment of Sherman Act claims against unions).
82 Ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982)) ("the labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce"); ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)) (restricting labor injunction).
83 Ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C § 101 (1982)).
84 See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).
8 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
808 (1945).
71
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the labor and product markets,"' but I think it serves as a useful
background to Meltzer's own comments and recommendations.
Meltzer showed some sympathy for antitrust legislation that would
prohibit union participation in price fixing, market divisions or exclusions, and direct limitations on production or sales-classic
"product market" restrictions-notwithstanding the "difficult
questions arising from the shadowy lines between labor markets
and final product markets. ' 87 He distinguished those kinds of
product-market restraints from restrictions on hours of work or
other incidents of the employment relationship. Price fixing and
other direct product-market constraints should, he argued, be prohibited regardless of whether they were accomplished through parallel agreements with individual employers or through the type of
agreements with employer "groups" condemned in Allen Bradley.88 Restraints stemming from agreements regarding employment
conditions should be immunized from the antitrust laws even if
originated by employers rather than by unions, and even if the employer could be shown to have the specific purpose of affecting the
product market. In both cases, Meltzer's position was based on the
rejection of "distinction[s] of no practical significance to the interest at stake."8 9 Meltzer argued persuasively that his rule recognized that employers may be acting on the basis of a legitimate
interest, be it economic or social, in the welfare of their employees.
More important, Meltzer rejected any test which would "make legality turn on issues of motivation that are both difficult of proof
and largely irrelevant to the issue of whether competition has been
restrained," and which as a practical matter are "likely to promote
disingenuous rhetoric and mock resistance" by employers.90
Meltzer's pragmatic instincts were also at the fore in his resos See Meltzer, supra note 72, at 668.
87 Id. at 705.
"' Id. at 704, 713. The Supreme Court subsequently seems to have agreed on the latter
point. See, e.g., Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 689 (1965) ("that the parties to the agreement are but a single employer and the unions
representing its employees does not compel immunity") (White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
Meltzer, supra note 72, at 672.
O Id. at 705. Curiously, Meltzer did not mention that his position was consistent with
that of Justice Stone in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). Stone apparently
accepted the notion that antitrust liability simply does not extend to certain restraints, regardless of whether they are brought about by unions or by employers. See id. at 512 (calling for "impartial application of the Sherman Act to the activities of industry & labor
alike"); cf. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366, 372-73 (2d Cir.) (holding mutual aid

agreement among employers in case of strike immune from antitrust laws), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 830 (1963).
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lution of other troublesome questions. As to the appropriateness of
antitrust liability for the anticompetitive effects of union opposition to technological change, he felt that any effort to distinguish
between "'good faith demands' for cushions against change and
ostensible demands for such cushions that are in fact directed at
blocking change altogether" should be resisted because of its likely
adverse impact on the bargaining process.9 1 Meltzer also rejected
the more radical proposals of the day to reduce the monopoly
power of unions by eliminating national unions or industry-wide
bargaining. His reasoning is a classic illustration of his general approach to emotionally charged issues. Meltzer saw that these proposals were so controversial as to be politically impractical. Nonetheless he was sympathetic to them in principle: they at least had
"the virtue of emphasizing that if regulation is to curb union
power, it must confront and deal with its sources rather than with
its symptoms. 9 2 In a passage that exhibited the kind of clearminded analysis he so often found lacking in courts, Meltzer did
not shy away from the opposition such proposals would engender,
since "similar objections are to be expected against any serious attempts to limit union power." But careful analysis revealed that
the proposals were flawed on the merits: they would have the
greatest impact on industries in which unions were weakest, a
"plainly perverse" outcome.9 4 He concluded on a modest note: his
own struggles to refine proposals to limit union power had "not
been fruitful," 95 and although specific recommendations or "a general endorsement of the existing structures of power" would be
"congenial," "such a happy ending would involve either a disregard
of what appear to be serious power imbalances or a conscious disregard of the limits of my own ignorance." 96
After the completion of the principal portion of Meltzer's 1965
article, but before its publication, the Supreme Court decided two
97
major antitrust cases. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
the union entered into an agreement with a group of large coal
companies, aiming to increase wages to a level that smaller nonmechanized operators could not meet. The Court held that "there
are limits to what a union or an employer may offer or extract in
91 Meltzer, supra note 72, at 707.
2
:3
4

Id.

at 711-12.

Id. at 710.
Id. at 711.

:" Id. at 712.
6 Id. at 714.
7 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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the name of wages." 98 A union "forfeits" its antitrust "exemption"
when it is "clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units," even
though the union's role is limited to securing uniform wages, hours,
or working conditions.9 In Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 10 on the other hand, a butchers'
union was held to be within its antitrust exemption when it obtained a multiemployer contract restricting night sales of fresh
meat. The restriction on marketing hours, while a direct restraint
on the product market, was found to be "intimately related" to the
butchers' working conditions; the union was found to have secured
the provision in pursuit of its own labor policies through arm's
length bargaining, rather than in furtherance of a union-employer
conspiracy. 10 '
Meltzer added an epilogue to his article in which he observed
ruefully that the Court had turned his suggestion "on its head by
condemning a bargain about wages on the ground that it was actuated by predatory purposes while upholding a market restriction
on the ground that its purpose was limited to protecting the legitimate interests of employees."'' 2 He proceeded to spell out some of
the disturbing implications of the Court's latest handiwork.
According to Meltzer, Pennington's condemnation of labor
contracts with extra-unit ramifications ignored two major dimensions of labor-antitrust law: the long-standing acceptance of multiemployer bargaining and the tolerance of "the imposition of uniform rates on competitors whatever the differences in their labor
markets-the union aside."' 0 3 Meltzer saw signs that "the law,
having swallowed an anti-competitive whale, was gagging at what,
at best, was a minnow."'' 0 4 He also raised characteristic concerns
with the practical effects of the Court's approach. To protect
themselves against allegations of extra-unit or predatory agreements, unions and employers would be tempted to resort to "disingenuous bargaining and unnecessary economic warfare" instead of
the frank and open exchanges that are the ideal of collective bargaining. 1 5 He was troubled even more by a potential return to ju9S Id. at 665.
99 Id.
100 381

U.S. 676 (1965).
,,Id. at 689-90.
"I Meltzer, supra note 72, at 715 (footnote omitted).
OS Id. at 718-19.
104Id. at 719 (footnote omitted).
105Id. at 730.
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dicial regulation of the substance of collective agreements; the contention in a case like Pennington that wage scales were set "too
high" implies that fact-finders are to be invited to substitute their
judgment for that of the employer and the union.
Meltzer agreed with Justice Goldberg's argument in dissent in
Penningtonthat there are serious difficulties in "giving decisive effect to motive or purpose as a basis for denying exemptions to collective bargains covering wages" and other working conditions. 10 6
This is no surprise, given Meltzer's general aversion to subjective
standards. But Meltzer rejected Justice Goldberg's bright-line rule
that "labor's exemption from the antitrust laws should be co-extensive with the area of mandatory bargaining.' ' 0 7 I am not sure
why Meltzer, prepared to reject the majority's view, balked at Justice Goldberg's solution. But I believe that his hesitation does not
stem from a rejection of the position on the merits. Rather, Meltzer was more likely to have exercised caution because Justice
Goldberg's test might in the end be taken to require the labor
board to exercise primary jurisdiction over these questions-an
outcome which Meltzer heartily and properly rejected.'0 o
Jewel Tea presented a confused picture. The Court produced
three separate opinions, each signed by three Justices; Justice
White expressed the closest thing we have to the position of the
Court. At one point, Justice White seemed to be "weighing" the
employees' interest in job content and working hours against the
admittedly adverse effects of the marketing restrictions on product
competition. 0 9 When it came to striking the balance among all the
factors in this particular case, however, Justice White was guilty of
Meltzer's accusation that he "emphasized the union's interests but
was wholly silent about the competing interest in competition in
the product market."" 0
More concretely, the restriction on the sale of fresh meat at
night was quietly accepted as exempt from the Sherman Act because it was not conspiratorial and was "intimately related" to the
employees' dual interest in controlling their jobs and in not working at night. But nothing was said about how minuscule any injury
to this interest would be were the grocery chains allowed to oper108 Id.
'07

at 731, 729-30 (referring to Justice Goldberg's opinion, 381 U.S. at 697).

Id. at 731.

"' See id. at 696-701, 731-34. Meltzer's view prevailed on this issue: the Supreme
Court in Jewel Tea rejected the argument that the Board had exclusive primary jurisdiction. See 381 U.S. at 684-88.
109 See 381 U.S. at 691.
"0 Meltzer, supra note 72, at 724-25.
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ate self-service meat departments at night."" Nor did Justice
White discuss whether the existence of contract provisions dealing
directly with job content and working hours would affect the analysis. Finally, no attention was paid to the other side of the scale.
The substantial interests of the public-Chicagoans who had to
work all day and who wished to shop for meat at night-ought to
have been considered. Their stake in this long-running dispute was
never mentioned. The larger public policy of preventing restraints
on competition for their patronage was given lip-service at best.
Meltzer's treatment of labor-antitrust is of a piece with his
overall response to labor questions. He shied away from the pursuit of slippery subjective factors such as purpose or motive, preferring to rely on objective consequences. He paid scrupulous attention to every fact or argument that could be marshalled,
including those that cut against his own predilections. And always
he decried the "abdication" by Congress of its duty to provide
clear standards, and the failure by the members of our highest
Court to honor their responsibility "to state clearly and to grapple
with the problems raised by the competing approaches of their col'1 12
leagues and by the precedents.
III.

CHOICE OF LAW AND CHOICE OF FORUM

Meltzer's penchant for the meticulous balancing of opposing
interests would seem to mark him as an ideal commentator on
questions concerning the proper relationship between federal and
state law and between public and private tribunals in the labor
field. If we expect our commentators to be accurate predictors of
the development of the law, however, this expectation has been
only partly realized. Meltzer's approach to arbitration has largely
prevailed. But while his analysis of federal preemption is as probing and comprehensive as anticipated, as a prophet he suffers from
the defects of his virtues. For Meltzer is like the fabled Fox, which
knows many things, while the Warren Court majority that was
dominant during the formative years of federal preemption doctrine was more like the Hedgehog, which knows the one big thing.
And the one big thing was to ensure the primacy of a uniform national labor policy by excluding state regulation of conduct that

11 The trial court had found that it was "impractical" to operate meat departments at
night without butchers or other employees. The court of appeals did not reach this finding,
and the Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge's "ultimate findings were [not] clearly
erroneous." See 381 U.S. at 694, 694-97.
"' Meltzer, supra note 72, at 734.
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was even "arguably" protected or prohibited by the NLRA. 11 That
made Meltzer a less than reliable predictor of federal preemption
developments during the twenty years following his principal contribution to the field in the late 1950s. 114 As we shall see, he has
fared better with the advent of a new Burger Court majority.
A.

Federal Preemption

In neither the Wagner Act nor the Taft-Hartley Act did Congress address in general terms the problem of allocating authority
over labor relations between the federal and state governments." 5
Yet Meltzer was surely correct that the Taft-Hartley proponents
favored "states' rights. ' 116 Despite legislative history which Meltzer believed indicates an absence of intent to "obliterate" state
power over labor relations, the Supreme Court in the Vinson and
Warren eras moved boldly ahead to establish an exclusive system
of federal regulation, along with comprehensive preemption of
state authority. Meltzer's particular views can best be illuminated
by examining some situations in which the tide of decision in that
era ran against him, some in which his position prevailed, and
some in which more recent developments have finally vindicated
his judgment.
Meltzer perceived early that labor law could not live with "primary jurisdiction," the requirement that a state tribunal refrain
from adjudicating a labor-related case until the Board has acted
and has thereby indicated the scope of state authority. 1 7 There
simply is not time for a two-step procedure in the ordinary case.
As a practical matter, then, the Board's interpretation of the labor
laws can be primary only if it is exclusive. Meltzer argued against
exclusivity largely on grounds of congressional intent. He also
closely examined the public policy arguments in support of the
contrary position, and found them wanting." 8 To Meltzer, the values of federalism suggested that "uniformity" was not to be an end
113 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
114

Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdictionover Labor Rela-

tions (ptS. I & II), 59 COLUM. L. REV. 6, 269 (1959).
1" See id. at 8-9. Certain specific federalism issues were covered in the NLRA, among
them the Board's power to cede jurisdiction to state agencies, section 10(a), ch. 372, § 10(a),
49 Stat. 453 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S. § 160(a) (1982)), and the power of the states to
regulate union security agreements, section 14(b), ch. 372, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 457 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1982)).
1"' Meltzer, supra note 114, at 20.
1
Id. at 19.
118Id. at 20-25.
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in itself; states should be permitted to act as long as their actions
were consistent with national standards. He rejected total state
preemption as a way to prevent competition in the enactment of
"pro-management laws," in part because "a vast body of state law
of general application. . . impinges on labor relations" and would
thus be swept away by the principle." 9 Despite his sympathy for
efforts to avoid excessive resort to fine lines of distinction between
appropriate federal and state spheres, Meltzer, as one "bred in the
common law tradition," refused to "ignore the need for discriminating distinctions directed at achieving some rational development of statutory and social purposes.' 120 There are, in short, political and social values "beyond the quiet life for judges and
lawyers.' 21 Finally, Meltzer rejected the view that the federalist
values of local autonomy, diversity, and experimentation would be
adequately protected by assigning to the states exclusive control
over small businesses; the systematic differences between small
and large enterprises would render the states a poor laboratory
122
were their experiments so restricted.
By early 1959, when Meltzer's views on preemption were published, the Supreme Court was already on record against several of
his positions. The Court had invalidated a state statute that required pre-strike mediation and an affirmative employee strike
vote: since the NLRA protected peaceful picketing for higher
wages, that "closed [the field] to state regulation.' 2 3 Even a state's
interest in maintaining essential services was held not to justify a
statute prohibiting strikes and lockouts and requiring compulsory
arbitration in certain labor disputes involving public utilities. 24 As
a final blow, the Supreme Court decided the leading preemption
case of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon125 in mid1959 and effectively embraced the broad preemption doctrine op-

Id. at 22.
12oId.
"

" Id. at 23. Of course, on other occasions Meltzer has given considerable weight to the
practical problem of drawing fine distinctions. See, e.g., supra notes 65, 90 and accompanying text.
12 Meltzer, supra note 114, at 23.
123 UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1950).
"2,Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-

tions Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951). But cf. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.,
347 U.S. 656, 669 (1954) (holding that states may grant tort remedies as result of violence in
a labor dispute); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 641-42 (1958) (upholding state law action by
employee against union for interference with access to workplace due to mass picketing and
threats of violence).
123 359 U.S. 236 (1959).

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[53:78

posed by Meltzer. The Court declared in Garmon that if "an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States. . . must
defer to the exclusive competence" of the Board. 126
Later the Court was to reject explicitly another argument
Meltzer made at this time. Section 14(b) of the NLRA expressly
authorizes state legislatures to forbid union security agreements.
Meltzer argued that this grant of authority "should apply not only
to consummated hiring arrangements, but also to antecedent pressures [i.e., strikes or picketing] directed toward their achievement.112 7 The Court, in contrast, held that picketing "lies exclusively in the federal domain . . . because state power, recognized

by § 14(b), begins only with the actual negotiation and execution
of the type of agreement described by § 14(b).' 28 That highly
literal reading finds policy support in the inherent ambiguity of
most picketing. There was a risk that a state judge in a right-towork jurisdiction, armed with the expected predisposition and a
convenient verbal formula, could have enjoined just about any
picketing under the proposed broader interpretation of section
14(b). Meltzer was aware of this risk, but thought that the general
grant of power to the states under section29 14(b) itself resolved similar doubts in favor of state regulation.1
In contrast to the reception given Meltzer's views on preemption in other areas, his analyses of federal-state questions have
fared well in tracking the main lines of Supreme Court developments regarding the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. In 1958 the tour-de-force that was Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills'30 sustained the constitutionality of section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act,' 3' which in terms had merely granted jurisdiction to the federal district courts over suits involving union-employer contracts, by decreeing that the provision directed the judiciary to fashion a whole new body of federal substantive law to
govern the enforcement of labor agreements. Meltzer did not pause
to examine the majority's opinion in Lincoln Mills, the methodology of which (at the very least) must have been somewhat startling
to this cautious craftsman. Instead he immediately turned to the
126

Id. at 245.

127 Meltzer, supra note 114, at 46-47.
"I Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 105 (1963) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted); see also Local 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S.
542 (1963).
129 Meltzer, supra note 114, at 47.
130

353 U.S. 448 (1957).

"I Ch. 120, title M, § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982)).
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several unanswered questions left in its wake.' 32
Meltzer correctly anticipated that the desirability of maintaining uniformity in the application of collective bargaining agreements would lead the Court to make federal substantive law under
section 301 exclusive, 13 3 but that the obvious purport of the provision to widen the range of available fora would also lead the Court
to allow state courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits to enforce
labor contracts. 34 Furthermore, Meltzer anticipated the dilemma
that would emerge when the Court faced the issue of remedies:
how was uniformity to be achieved in light of the conflict between
the ban on federal injunctions against strikes under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the states' power to provide such equitable relief?.
As Meltzer observed, and as the Supreme Court later held,'3 5
the Congress that enacted section 301 had "deliberately declined
to lift the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act from the federal courts."' 3' Yet there was no indication of a purpose similarly
to limit state remedies, and states without parallel "little" NorrisLaGuardia restrictions continued to issue injunctions against
strikes in breach of contract.'37 Meltzer apparently leaned towards
promoting uniformity by extending the Norris-LaGuardia ban to
state courts in contract actions, despite the "ironic twist" that section 301 would then narrow rather than broaden available remedies. 1 38 But Meltzer was too much the good lawyer to foresee that
the Supreme Court would eventually overrule itself and conclude,
in the landmark Boys Markets case, 3 9 that Congress had actually
authorized at least a partial "accommodation" between the terms
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the policy of section 301. After
that case, Norris-LaGuardia notwithstanding, federal courts could
enforce a contractual no-strike clause by enjoining a strike over a
grievance that the union was entitled by contract to take to
140
arbitration.

11

See Meltzer, supra note 114, at 276-81.
See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1962).

'13 See id. at 101 n.9; Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).

See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 203-10 (1962).
Meltzer, supra note 114, at 281.
137 See, e.g., McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d
45, 63-64, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
M1Meltzer, supra note 114, at 279-81. Union removal of section 301 suits from state to
federal courts, see Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557
(1968) (permitting removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441), would have reduced the federal-state
deviations in any event.
13 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
110 See id. at 249-53.
135

"
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Meltzer is at his insightful best in dealing with the division of
responsibility for determining mixed questions of contract and
statutory interpretation. Such overlaps are common occurrences. A
collective bargaining agreement may forbid anti-union discrimination that is also prohibited by the NLRA. 141 A striking union may
interpose the defense that the contract's general no-strike clause
does not, as a matter of law, cover a walkout triggered by the employer's unfair labor practices. 42 Or, most problematically, a contract suit may raise an issue peculiarly involving Board expertise,
such as the representational capacity of the signatory union.14 3 In
all three situations, Meltzer would generally allow the court (or an
arbitrator) to proceed without prior Board adjudication
of the stat45
44
prevailed.1
largely
have
views
His
issues.1
utory
His reasons are both theoretical and practical. The earlier,
classic preemption cases involved the enforcement of "obligations
imposed by the coercive power of the state," not "obligations voluntarily assumed by the parties." 4 6 Were preemption the rule in
contract enforcement cases, the national policy favoring the use of
arbitration could otherwise be undercut by an "artificial fragmentation of the arbitrator's jurisdiction.' 47 In addition, Meltzer suggested that the rejection of preemption would be good medicine for
the courts: an expansive view of judicial power to enforce contracts, while forcing the courts to face "difficult and specialized issues," would "reduce the possibility that undue preoccupation with
so-called 'expertise' and with 'uniformity' would result in the de48
nial of prompt and comprehensive relief."'
Almost as an aside, Meltzer identified at this early stage a
problem that the Supreme Court laid to rest only years later. Suppose a union engages in "stranger" (nonemployee) picketing on an
See Meltzer, supra note 114, at 282-89.
See id. at 289-92.
'43 See id. at 292-95.
1" Meltzer appeared to see the arguments in the representation case as closely bal141
142

anced, but to have rejected primary jurisdiction in part because courts acting in equity were
to be trusted to withhold relief where administrative remedies were adequate or future administrative action is likely to nullify the judicial remedy. See id. at 295 & n.279.
145 See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964) (arbitration of jurisdictional dispute); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962) (suit on contract for
damages for antiunion discrimination).
14' Meltzer, supra note 114, at 286. Oddly, Meltzer did not argue that unlike the preemption cases involving a potential clash between state law and sections seven and eight of
the NLRA, the question of judicial authority under section 301 presents the issue of accommodating several presumably coequal provisions of the same federal statute.
147

Id. at 288.

148Id. at 295 (footnote omitted).
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employer's parking lot, seeking recognition, when it still represents
only a minority of the employees. The picketing might arguably be
protected by the NLRA as the union's only feasible means of
reaching the employees,149 and it might arguably be prohibited as a
violation of section 8(b)(7)'s limitations on organizational and
recognitional picketing. The employer can ordinarily get a ruling
on the "arguably prohibited" side of the question by filing a charge
under section 8(b)(7). If the General Counsel dismisses the charge,
all can safely conclude that the union has not engaged in prohibited conduct. But the possibility that the picketing is protected remains open. Unfortunately for the employer, as Meltzer recognized, that issue cannot be resolved absent some action or threat
the filing of unby the employer against the picketers, followed by
150
fair labor practice charges against the employer.
Meltzer posed this dilemma as a basis for his conclusion that
state courts should be allowed to enjoin minority recognitional
picketing, 151 a position plainly at odds with subsequent expansive
developments in preemption law. 152 But his views retain their force
in the context of state laws of general application, such as antitrespass statutes. Only in 1978 did the Supreme Court finally hold
that a state could enjoin peaceful trespassory picketing that was
both arguably protected and arguably prohibited by federal labor
law.' 53 The Court reasoned that the state's action would not interfere with federal prohibition of unfair labor practices, because such
an injunction would not concern the nature of the picketing but
rather the separate question of its location.15 4 As to the possibility
that protected conduct was in jeopardy, the Court was satisfied
that that likelihood was remote, given that trespassory activity by
nonemployees is only rarely found to be protected under the
NLRA. 155 The overriding practical consideration, as Meltzer had
recognized two decades earlier, was that "the party who could have

149

See NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1948); cf.

Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 799 (1945) (suggesting a strict standard for
infeasibility of alternative access).
,50 Meltzer, supra note 114, at 18-19.
151Id. at 24-25.
152 See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 144-48 (1976) (even conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited
by the NLRA cannot be regulated by the states if it is central to the federal statutory
scheme and is thus intended by Congress to be left to the free play of economic forces).
153 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180 (1978).
11 Id. at 197-98.
,55 Id. at 204-07.
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presented the protection issue to the Board has not done so and
the other party to the dispute has no acceptable means of doing
SO. '' 156

B.

Once again, Meltzer's reasoning had prevailed.

The Arbitrator and the Law

A simpler, more casual, and, perhaps for those reasons, more
incisive Meltzer is revealed in a graceful little paper he delivered at
the annual meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators in
1967.157 Among his themes were two of the most persistent and
divisive issues in labor arbitration: What is the proper standard for
judicial review of an arbitral award? What should an arbitrator do
when confronted with a direct conflict between the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and the provisions of applicable statutory or common law?
Meltzer made the quite sensible suggestion that "the courts in
actions involving the validity of the award should have more responsibility for the merits than in actions to compel arbitration." 8 I do not see how it could be otherwise, assuming the
courts are to have any responsibility for the merits. There is a difference between a pediatrician's responsibility for a newly betrothed woman and for a newly born child. As I have elaborated
elsewhere,15 9 I believe that, at least as between the parties themselves, the arbitration award is the parties' own agreed-upon
"reading" of their contract, and that, within certain well-recognized limitations, the courts are in the business of enforcing contracts. But Meltzer placed his rationale on a loftier level. Invoking
the "responsible exercise of judicial power," he argued that courts
should not be required "to rubber-stamp the awards of private decision-makers when the courts are convinced that there is no rational basis in the agreements for the awards they are asked to
enforce."' 6 0
However divergent our rationales, our positions converge.
Both of us would agree that a court should decline to enforce an
award that has no rational basis. I would simply say that a court
should do so in order to preserve the intent of the parties (who

156 Id. at 202-03.
'" Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHL L.
REV. 545 (1967).
158

Id. at 553.

151See St. Antoine, JudicialReview of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at
Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140-41 (1977).
160 Meltzer, supra note 157, at 553-54.
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presumably selected their arbitrator on the assumption that he or
she was not insane, irrational, or corrupt), rather than to preserve
its own integrity. Yet as a practical matter, I recognize much truth
in Meltzer's observation that "the unique attempt to shrivel judicial responsibility in enforcing arbitration awards is likely to fail
because it runs against the grain of judicial tradition."1 " We also
see eye-to-eye on the competing values at stake: even "drastically
limited judicial review" creates "serious risks" for the vitality of
the arbitration process, which depends upon a "tradition of judi16 2
cial self-limitation.
In addressing the much-bruited question of the arbitrator's responsibility when "there is an irrepressible conflict" between the
contract and the law, Meltzer was blunt: "the arbitrator, in my
opinion, should respect the agreement and ignore the law."' 6 3 I
think both principle and practical considerations support his view.
The leading Supreme Court case, United Steelworkers of America
6 4 itself declares that an arbitrav. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,1
tor who makes an award "based solely on [his] view of the requirements of enacted legislation" exceeds his authority. 65 Moreover,
arbitrators, many of whom are not even lawyers, may have no special expertise in complex and changing statutory areas. A conscientious arbitrator can retain his integrity and avoid misleading the
parties by noting that he is not passing on the legality of a questionable contractual provision.
As a practical matter, of course, the intellectual high jinks of
the great contract-versus-law debate are of limited concern. Arbitrators have always interpreted the law and always will. An arbitrator may often have occasion to turn to a statute for guidance in
interpreting a particular contractual provision, especially if the
contract was written to parallel the legislation. And, as Meltzer
correctly pointed out, genuine ambiguities can always be construed
so as to make the contract compatible with the law. 6 ' I strongly
suspect that the strategem of resolving contractual ambiguities so
as to avoid conflict with the statute enables most arbitrators to
avoid ever facing the storied choice. There are but few conflicts
that cannot, in Meltzer's words, be repressed.

'
162

Id. at 554.

Id. at 554-55.

,63 Id. at 557.
363 U.S. 593 (1960).
165 Id. at 597.
166 Meltzer, supra note 157, at 557.
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DISCRIMINATION

The problem of racial discrimination in employment raises
many of the kinds of issues most likely to attract Meltzer's critical
eye. Attempts to read broad social justice into labor statutes and
collective bargaining agreements present now-familiar concerns:
preserving the integrity of the statutory scheme and of the parties'
bargain, and establishing the proper boundaries of the roles of arbitrators, the Board, and the courts. And the perplexing question
of the legality of private-sector affirmative action plans occasioned
Meltzer's most recent return to what is perhaps his most central
theme-that the Court must do its job well.
A.

On Reading a Ban on Racial Discrimination into the National
Labor Relations Act
The Taft-Hartley Act, which was enacted over a presidential

veto by a Congress in a conservative mood, 167 for the first time

made it an unfair labor practice for a union (as it had previously
been for an employer) to coerce or discriminate against employees
because of their participation or nonparticipation in organizational
activities. 168 Hubert Humphrey tried to push his party further in
the direction of labor law reform a year later by waging a bitter
battle to include a plank in the Democratic party platform supporting the creation of a congressional Fair Employment Practices
Committee. The same Congress that enacted Taft-Hartley subsequently rejected Humphrey's proposal without hesitation, against
the wishes of victorious presidential candidate Harry Truman. 69
The Taft-Hartley Congress hardly seemed to have intended to
initiate a liberal social agenda in the field of labor relations. Yet
some seventeen years later, in the very year in which Congress finally and explicitly outlawed racial discrimination in employment
by passing Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,17 0 the Board
managed to hold, in the face of this history, that prior labor statutes had already accomplished much of the task. A union that refused to process a black employee's grievance, the Board declared,
was guilty of an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act
and was not entitled to remain certified as the employees' exclusive
167

See PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AmERICAN HISTORY 579-83 (1964); FOSTER

RHEA DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 372-73 (1949).

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)-(2) (1982).
See BERNARD BAmYN ET AL., THE GREAT REPUELIC 115 (1977).
170 Title VII, §§ 701-704, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253-57 (codified as amended at
166
109

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000el-e3 (1982)).
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bargaining agent. 17 1 A decade later two courts of appeals went even
further, holding that under the Wagner Act an employer could assert a union's discriminatory membership practices as a defense to
a bargaining order, 17 2 and that an employer could not discharge
black employees who refused to abide by a contractual grievance
procedure but instead engaged in concerted picketing to get the
employer to deal directly with them.'7 3
Meltzer could easily have chided the Board and the courts for
infidelity to congressional intent, but he preferred a more functional critique of incorporating a ban on racial discrimination into
the preexisting law of labor-management relations. Introducing
discrimination issues into representation cases, he asserted, would
inevitably lengthen proceedings, thus increasing the likelihood of
erosion of employee support for the union due to delay.174 Allowing
minority groups within bargaining units to deal directly with their
employer would require the Board to apply an "unworkably vague"
standard in determining which blocs of employees were no longer
subject to the principle of exclusive representation. Separate dealings had the potential to destroy orderly collective bargaining, to
undercut policies against protracted recognitional picketing and in
favor of arbitration, and to disrupt industrial peace. 775 The Supreme Court and the Board were eventually to see it Meltzer's
76

way.1

171 Independent Metal Workers, Local No. 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573,
1577-78 (1964). The majority of the Board in Hughes Tool reiterated the position it took in
an earlier case, Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963), in which it first held a union's breach of its duty of fair representation to
be an unfair labor practice. That position was later upheld by the Fifth Circuit. See Local
Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); see also infra
note 176.
172 NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 473-74 (8th Cir.
1973) (relying in part on the due process clause). But cf. Bell & Howell Co., 230 N.L.R.B.
420, 421 (1977) (denying the applicability of the due process clause), enforced, 598 F.2d 136
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979). The Board has not been consistent as to when
it will consider the issue of race discrimination. It initially held that claims of invidious
discrimination would be heard in representation proceedings, see Bekins Moving & Storage
Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974) (but holding also that consideration after union wins election
is adequate), but later reversed itself by holding that discrimination claims would only be
considered in unfair labor practice proceedings, see Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 447
(1977).
173 Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd
sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
, Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination:The More
Remedies, the Better? 42 U. CHL L. REv. 1, 15 (1974).
175 Id. at 32, 35.
176 See supra notes 172, 173. Meltzer did not directly address one important issue, the
notion that a union which discriminates on the basis of race violates its duty to represent all
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B. Arbitration and Title VII
On the appropriate role of the arbitrator in dealing with Title
VII discrimination issues, Meltzer was as direct as he was in dealing with arbitration in general: the arbitrator should follow the
contract regardless of any apparent conflict with the statute. 177 Arbitrators lack "institutional" competence "with respect to awards
enforcing the law and abrogating the contract."'178 This position,
based on the view that arbitral and judicial remedies should remain distinct, had two corollaries: an arbitral ruling on discrimination should not foreclose an independent judicial determination,
and an employee should not be required to exhaust contractual
procedures before
invoking statutory remedies against
79
discrimination.
In the leading case of Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 80 the
Supreme Court essentially adopted Meltzer's position against arbitral foreclosure of Title VII claims. Although the Court noted that
"the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to
the law of the shop, not the law of the land"' 8' -which had been
Meltzer's primary rationale-the Court laid greater emphasis on
other factors. The Court noted that discrimination involves individual rights not created by statutory processes of union representation and collective bargaining, rights which are thus not waivable
by unions that enter arbitration agreements.18

2

The general intent

of Congress to grant overlapping remedies against discrimination
also argued against foreclosure of Title VII claims. 1

3

The Court

clouded the issue, however, by stating in dictum that in appropriate circumstances a prior arbitral award could be admitted and accorded "great weight" in Title VII proceedings, but that courts
must nonetheless safeguard the "full availability" of the judicial
forum. 184
employees, and thereby commits an unfair labor practice. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. He did note, however, that the Board's power to revoke certification was rarely
used "and was probably viewed as a paper tiger." Meltzer, supra note 174, at 4. The Su-

preme Court has apparently accepted the notion that union racial discrimination is an unfair labor practice. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1967) (discussing MirandaFuel
and concluding that it does not require preemption under Garmon).
177See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
178 Meltzer, supra note 3, at 33-34.
171 Id.

at 42-45, 47.

180 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
181 Id. at 57; see also id. at 52 n.16 (citing Meltzer).
182 Id. at 51-52.
183 Id. at 47-49.
'" Id. at 60 n.21.
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As Meltzer later pointed out, the Court in Gardner-Denver
"did not pause" to address the question of arbitral enforcement of
contract provisions "similar to or duplicative of" federal antidiscrimination laws. 185 As a reaction to Gardner-Denver, both "expansionist" and "limitist" proposals for new collective bargaining
provisions were sounded in various quarters. The former would
have given arbitrators explicit authority to apply all applicable antidiscrimination law and to invalidate and rewrite the parties' contracts as necessary. Limitist proposals, on the other hand, would
have excluded grievances that are cognizable under Title VII from
arbitration. Not surprisingly, Meltzer was hostile to both extremes.
Private enforcement of public policy was not an unmitigated good.
Employer and union consent to expansionist clauses, he worried,
might be "formal rather than real," and the very qualities that
make arbitration so valuable in "a system of private ordering"--its
informality, privacy, ad hoc recruitment of personnel, and so
on-"compromise it as an instrument of important public
purposes."' 18 6
I agree with Meltzer's rejection of these so-called expansionist
clauses on practical grounds: they would hardly be likely to lead
the federal judiciary to grant true deference to the arbitration of
Title VII claims.18 7 But on a theoretical level, I see no reason to
prevent an agreeable set of parties from authorizing a qualified arbitrator to subordinate the contract to his interpretation of enacted law in pursuit of greater finality. As to limitist proposals, I
agree fully with Meltzer that they are quite unrealistic. Discrimination claims, often interwined with other issues, are legion in today's grievance machinery. Their total exclusion from arbitration
188
would drastically curtail the scope of the arbitration process.
Ever mindful that arbitration is more a substitute for economic
warfare than for judicial process, Meltzer was wisely protective of
its role. 189

185

Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Discrimination:The Parties'Process and the Pub-

lic's Purposes, 43 U. CH. L. REv. 724, 725 (1976).
I Id. at 729-30.
's

Meltzer suggested this result as well. See id. at 732-33.

18 Cf. Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation:Reflections of a Judge, 35

NAT'L ACAD. ARB.PROC. 16, 21-22, 27-28 (1983) (discussing superiority of arbitration over
adjudication for resolving typical arbitrable issues, partly because exclusion of public law
issues from scope of arbitration simplified the process).
' See Meltzer, supra note 3, at 34.
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C. Affirmative Action
Affirmative action is an issue guaranteed to bring out the best
and the worst in Meltzer. He knew, as anyone who scans the legislative history with an unbiased eye would know,190 that the Congress which enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 had
color-blindness as its guiding principle. And the statutory language
could hardly have more clearly incorporated that standard than by
forbidding employers (or unions) "to discriminate against any individual. . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 191
In Steelworkers v. Weber,192 the Supreme Court upheld a
"private, voluntary" affirmative action plan that was the product
of collective bargaining. The plan reserved for black employees
fifty percent of the openings in an in-house craft-training program.
The racial quota was to terminate when the percentage of black
craftworkers in the previously segregated plant became commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the local labor force. Until
that time, however, black employees who applied for the training
program were preferred over white applicants with greater
seniority.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, first emphasized
that the case presented solely a "narrow statutory issue": since the
union-employer plan involved no state action, no constitutional
question was raised under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.193 Then, conceding that a literal interpretation
of Title. VII as prohibiting all race-conscious programs was "not
without force,"11e4 he turned to the spirit of the legislation and concluded that "it would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice. . . constituted the
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hi-

190For an extraordinarily convincing survey of the congressional debates, see Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 230-52 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) (employers); id. § 2000e-2(c)(1) (labor organizations); id. § 2000e-2(d) (employers or labor organizations in control of training programs).
192 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (5-2 decision).
193 Id. at 200. Justice Brennan did not, however, take note of the fact that the plan
may have been adopted at least in part in response to pressure from the U.S. Office of
Federal Contract Compliance. See 443 U.S. at 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Meltzer, The
Weber Case: The JudicialAbrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment,
47 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 438 n.73, 443-44, 446 (1980).
19 443 U.S. at 201.
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erarchy."' 19 5 Justice Brennan bolstered his position by pointing to
section 703() of the Act, which provides that nothing in Title VII
shall "require" any employer to grant preferential treatment.19 6
Had Congress wished, it could have just as easily disclaimed the
intent to "permit" as well as the intent to "require" preferential
treatment as a remedy for racial imbalance. Instead, he argued,
Congress chose not to limit managerial freedom to employ certain
7
justifiable racial preferences.'9
Meltzer was devastating in dealing with the notion that the
"statutory purpose identified by the majority-to help blacks get
jobs"'1 9 -required the result reached by the majority. To Meltzer,
"under the statute that end... was to be advanced by a particular means": by equal opportunity rather than by preferences in
employment. 199 Meltzer also embraced Justice Rehnquist's effective refutation of the argument from section 703(j). The provision
was inserted in specific response to the objection that the Act
would authorize courts and agencies to force preferential treatment
of minorities on unwilling employers; Congress did not need to address voluntary preferences because they were banned by the gen2 00
eral prohibitory language of Title VII.
Meltzer was surely correct that Justice Brennan's opinion in
Weber lacked the "power to convince." 201 But Meltzer failed to
consider the severe tactical handicap that constrained Justice
Brennan's effort to marshal a majority. Justices Powell and Stevens did not participate in Weber. The Bakke case, 0 2 which involved medical-school admissions quotas, had established an alignment of Justices which, if carried over to Weber unchanged, would
have resulted in a four-to-three majority in favor of affirmative action: too narrow and indecisive a result for the first Supreme Court
test of this important issue in the employment field.2 03 Justice
195
9

Id. at 204.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982).

443 U.S. at 204-07.
I'l Meltzer, supra note 193, at 446.
' Id. at 446-47 (emphasis added).
200 433 U.S. at 244-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Meltzer, supra note 193,
at 445-46. It
is possible, of course, that members of Congress simply failed to imagine the possibility of
voluntary implementation of affirmative action plans.
202 Meltzer, supra note 193, at 465.
2"2 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Bakke involved Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-d (1982), which prohibits discrimination by
recipients of federal funding.
203 The core four members of the Weber majority, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun, had joined in an opinion in Bakke which broadly endorsed the remedial use
of racial classifications under both Title VI and the equal protection clause. See Bakke, 438
"
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Stewart's switch from his anti-quota position in Bakke was critical
to Justice Brennan's commanding five-to-two majority in Weber. °4
Justice Stewart seemed to be more averse to public than to
private racial preferences. 0 5 It was therefore probably vital, in order to gain his vote, that Justice Brennan refrain from any grounds
for the Weber decision that would broaden the preexisting scope of
the Court's approval of governmental affirmative action.2 0 6 Justice
Brennan was thus deprived of an argument that would have bolstered his position. He could have argued that Congress was aware
when it amended Title VII in 1972207 that a court of appeals had
sustained a presidential affirmative action program for government
contractors against constitutional and statutory challenges. 08 Senator Sam Ervin had offered two amendments to Title VII, in part
in response to that executive program. 20 9 The defeat of his amendments by two-to-one margins 10 would suggest that Congress did
not understand the general prohibition of discrimination in Title
VII as a ban on affirmative action plans. This argument, however,
would implicate governmental affirmative action plans, since the
case and the ensuing debate concerned action by the executive
branch. To make the argument might have placed Justice Stewart's vote at risk.
U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
24 In Bakke, Justice Stewart had joined in an opinion that rejected the quota on

purely statutory grounds. 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). While Bakke involved Title VI and Weber involved Title VII, the opinion Justice
Stewart joined in Bakke gave no indication that it adopted a definition of "discrimination"
which was unique to Title VI. See id. at 413 ("Title VI is an integral part of the far-reaching
Civil Rights Act of 1964").
205 It would be a mistake to say that Justice Stewart was completely comfortable with
the private use of racial classifications. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (1980)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing against governmental use of racial classifications in part
because it will foster private discrimination). However, his opinion in Fullilove was centrally
concerned with constitutional requirements and the proper role of courts and legislatures in
the light of those requirements, see id. at 523-28, concerns that are not implicated by private affirmative action plans.
206 Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke rested in part on constitutional grounds, see
supra note 203; the opinion joined by Justice Stevens expressly rejected Justice Brennan's
effort to declare the "constitutional effects of this Court's judgment" in Bakke, see 438 U.S.
at 408 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). No opinion commanded a
majority, thus leaving the major issues unresolved.
207 Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e1-2000e17 (1982)).
208 Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971).
209 118 CONG. REC. 1663, 4918 (1972) (discussing Philadelphia plan at issue in
Contractors).
210 Id. at 1676, 4918.
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The most profound failure of the Weber opinion, its unwillingness to come to grips with the meaning of the term "discriminate,"
can also be explained by the desire to avoid a holding with broad
constitutional significance. Meltzer alluded in a footnote to Justice
Brennan's failure to address the critical distinction between "benign" and "malign" discrimination, but did not pursue the question in depth.2 1 ' For me the issue is central. I believe that there is
a fundamental moral and legal difference between action taken by
a majority to foster participation by a previously excluded minor21 2
ity and action taken to perpetuate that minority's exclusion.
This difference must be taken into account despite the immense
practical difficulties always inherent in the need to draw liles.
Meltzer clearly recognized the core issue "iresented by the
Weber case. He was close to the mark wlien he declared: "Weber
is, in fact, an important step in the transformation of the classic
and widely supported liberal ideal of equal opportunity for individuals into a new program of equal outcomes for groups." 213 But ultimately I think he missed the mark. "Equal outcomes" is the giveaway. I know of no serious advocate of affirmative action who
would go so far as to seek "equal outcomes for groups." This overstatement is one of the rare occasions on which I have detected
Meltzer indulging in the sort of loose rhetoric he so properly indicts in others. Advocates of affirmative action are simply willing
to acknowledge the possibility that white America has perpetrated
a wrong against blacks as a group that is so deep and so pervasive
that attempts to identify individual victims are at best futile, at
" Meltzer, supra note 193, at 440 n.84.
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 (1977). For a debate
on the issue, see Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L.
REv. 723, 728-36 (1974); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionalityof Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Sandalow, Racial Preferencesin
Higher Education: PoliticalResponsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHL L. REV. 653
(1975) (discussing the opposing views of Ely and Posner). For a reflection of the debate in
the popular literature, see Cohen, Why Racial Preference Is Illegal and Immoral, COM ENTARY, June 1979, at 40, 44.
The cited authorities are primarily concerned with constitutional standards of "equal
protection," about which it is difficult to make seemingly conclusory arguments from "plain
meaning." But even the meaning of the arguably less elastic term "discriminate" is subject
to interpretation. Today the term often connotes invidious distinctions, not mere line-drawing. As one of our most distinguished federal judges has remarked, "to discriminate ...
more often means, both in common and particularly in legal parlance, to distinguish or differentiate without sufficient reason." NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 181 (2d Cir.
1963) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). If Judge Friendly is correct, "discrimination" analysis inevitably draws us to an evaluation of whether (and how well) a distinction
serves the purposes of an otherwise valid statutory scheme.
222

212 Meltzer, supra note 193, at 456.
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worst a mockery of justice. While Meltzer is receptive to an attack
on unequal conditions that would be based on "need or disadvantage-a criterion that [is] a better measure of inequality of condition and less troublesome-morally and politically-than race,"2 14
I can only testify sadly to my doubt that there exists a mature
American black who is not disadvantaged. It is better, in my view,
to adopt a legal standard which openly acknowledges the moral
and political quandary that has resulted from our history of group
discrimination.
It goes almost without saying that Meltzer asked hard, probing, practical questions about what is needed to move blacks into
the mainstream of the economy. He was concerned, for instance,
that official pressure for affirmative action might contribute to the
flight of business from black population centers, "intensify racial
politics and further polarize our work forces and our communities."2 15 In the past I worried about similar questions, and I do not
now mean blithely to dismiss them. But I have become increasingly aware that few blacks outside academia share such concerns.
For them, affirmative action is worth the risks-and I am prepared
to abide by their judgment of their best interests. I also rely on
white self-interest to bring this unique societal experiment to a
halt as soon as it has achieved its goal of a truly integrated work
force-if not sooner.
A PERSONAL CONCLUSION
It has been a privilege to retrace the path of one of the great
pioneering figures in labor law scholarship. As has probably become clear, I do not share all of Professor Meltzer's values and
attitudes. It has gradually dawned on me during this intellectual
journey, however, that I know of no person in the entire field of
labor relations who is so adept at asking all the right questions,
recognizing all the competing interests, and exposing all the ancient shibboleths. I observed earlier that he suffers from the defects of his virtues: I am not prepared to nominate Professor Meltzer as the foremost philosopher of labor law. But my traversal of
his work has led me to conclude that he deserves the title which
any good worker would say is only a little less exalted: he is our
finest craftsman.

214
211

Id. at 447.
Id. at 457-58.

